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Abstract 
Verbal lie detection tools are almost exclusively examined in Western Europe and 
North America, but practitioners worldwide show interest in such tools. Since cultural 
differences in the efficacy of such tools may occur, it is important to examine their 
efficacy in different cultures. In this article, we focus on proportion of complications, 
which in previous research was more diagnostic than ‘total details’ in two British 
samples and in three samples that each included Hispanic, Russian, and South Korean 
participants. In the present article, we merged the three non-British samples and 
analysed the data by presenting them for each cultural group separately. Truth tellers 
disclosed the details of a trip away they had made, whereas liars fabricated such 
details. Proportion of complications discriminated truth tellers from liars in all three 
groups and was consistently a better indicator of veracity than total details. 
Implications of the findings are discussed.  
  
 Keywords: verbal cues to deception, within-subjects comparisons, liars’ strategies, 
complications, proportion of complications, total details 
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Complications Travel: A cross-cultural comparison of the proportion of 
complications as a verbal cue to deceit 
 Verbal lie detection tools are almost exclusively examined in Western Europe 
and North America, but practitioners frequently ask whether such tools are effective 
across cultures (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018). Since cultural differences may influence 
the efficacy of such tools, it is needed to examine their efficacy in different cultures 
before their widespread use can be recommended. In this article, we examined one 
verbal lie detection approach, which focuses on the proportion of complications, 
amongst Hispanic, Russian and South Korean participants.  
Amongst the verbal cues to deception that researchers have examined during 
the last 30 years, total details is one of the strongest indicators. It emerged as the 
strongest cue amongst the 19 cues investigated in a meta-analysis of Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis (CBCA) research, a frequently used verbal veracity assessment tool 
(Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016). The typical finding is that truth tellers 
report more details than liars (Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). 
Two reasons are typically given for this veracity effect. First, liars may be unable to 
fabricate enough details that also sound plausible, a conclusion derived from the 
CBCA literature (Köhnken, 2004). Second, liars may be unwilling to provide many 
details out of fear that some of them will give leads to investigators that will reveal 
that they are lying (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014).  
Recently, Vrij and colleagues suggested that total details does not make 
optimum use of the different strategies truth tellers and liars typically employ (Vrij et 
al., 2017, 2018a, b, 2019). They argued that both truth tellers and liars will report 
details to appear convincing, but that the type of detail they report will differ. They 
proposed to distinguish between one type of detail that truth tellers are more likely to 
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report (complications) and two types of detail that liars are more likely to report 
(common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies) and to use the 
proportion of cues to truthfulness (i.e. the proportion of complications) as a measure. 
They argued that since the proportion of complications takes the different strategies 
from truth tellers and liars better into account than total details, it should differentiate 
truth tellers from liars better than the total details variable.  
 A complication is an occurrence that makes a situation more difficult to report 
than necessary (“We did not see him, we were waiting at a different entrance”) (Vrij 
et al., 2018b). Complications have been examined before and is one of the 19 criteria 
that constitutes the CBCA-list. According to a recent CBCA meta-analysis, 
complications are more likely to occur in truthful statements than in deceptive 
statements (Amado et al., 2016; Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2017b). Truth tellers are 
thought to report more complications than liars because liars prefer to keep their 
stories simple (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007), whereas reporting 
complications makes a story more complex.  
 Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical information 
about events (“We visited the zoo and saw lots of animals”) (Vrij et al., 2018b). Liars 
are more likely to include common knowledge details in their statements than truth 
tellers (Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014), because when describing a made-up 
activity they lack the personal experiences truth tellers can report.  
 Self-handicapping strategies refer to justifications as to why someone is not able 
to provide information (Vrij et al., 2018b). Such justifications can be explicit (“I can’t 
remember his name, I am bad at remembering names”) or implicit (“I slept in the 
train”). Liars are more likely to include self-handicapping strategies in their 
statements than truth tellers. For liars to keep their stories simple, not providing too 
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many details is an attractive strategy. However, they run the risk not to be believed if 
they provide not enough detail. A solution is to offer a justification for not being able 
to report details.  
In all five studies to date in which complications, common knowledge details, 
self-handicapping strategies and total details have been examined (Leal, Vrij, Deeb, & 
Kamermans, 2019; Vrij et al., 2017, 2018a, b, 2019)1, it was found that truth tellers 
reported more complications and liars more self-handicapping strategies (liars did not 
always report more common knowledge details). In addition, in all five studies the 
proportion of complications was higher amongst truth tellers than liars. Also, the main 
hypothesis that the proportion of complications is more diagnostic in discriminating 
truth tellers from liars than total number of details was supported in all five studies.  
In Leal et al. (2019) and Vrij et al. (2018b) the participants were British and 
the results have been fully reported. In each of the other three studies (Vrij, 2017, 
2018a, 2019) participants were from Russian, South-Korean and Hispanic origin. 
Differences between these three nationalities (Russians, Koreans and Hispanics) were 
not discussed as nationality was always introduced as a covariate. Since all these three 
studies employed a similar procedure, it would be possible to merge these data sets of 
Vrij et al. (2017, 2018a, 2019). This has been done in the current article. The 
innovative aspect of the current article is the Group analyses in which we examined 
the verbal cues total details, complications, common knowledge details, self-
handicapping strategies and proportion of complications in each of the three 
nationalities. We thus addressed practitioners’ request to focus on cross-cultural 
findings.  
In the three studies that formed the basis of this article, participants were 
university students and interviewed by local interviewers in their own language at 
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their local university. In theory we could make two comparisons: (i) Comparing the 
three groups for speech differences or (ii) comparing the difference between truth 
tellers and liars in each group. The first comparison is in the present sample somewhat 
problematic because the groups differed on various aspects, including being 
interviewed by different interviewers. Neither is this a comparison practitioners are 
particularly interested in. For them the crucial question is the cultural (in)stability of 
diagnostic cues to deceit, which is examined in the second comparison. The few 
studies that examined cross-cultural differences in verbal cues to deception (Leal et 
al., 2018; Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017; Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & van 
der Zee, 2017) found differences in the diagnostic value of these cues across cultures. 
This makes it worthwhile to examine differences in the diagnostic value of the verbal 
veracity cues total details, complications, common knowledge details, self-
handicapping strategies and the proportion of complications across cultures. We 
explored whether the main hypothesis that the proportion of complications is more 
diagnostic in discriminating truth tellers from liars than total number of details found 
support in all three Groups.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 608 University students (135 males, 466 females and seven 
unknown) took part in the three studies. Their age ranged from 18-42 years with an 
average age of M = 21.82 years (SD = 3.41). The experiment took place in three 
different universities in Russia, South Korea and Texas, USA, and the participants 
were of Russian (n = 239), Korean (n = 240), and Hispanic (n = 129) origin.
 Conducting a posthoc power analysis using G*Power software revealed that 
for a one-tailed test, a moderate effect size of r = 0.30 (the equivalent of d = 0.586, 
which is the average of d-scores for the dependent variables when the total sample is 
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considered, see Table 1), an alpha error rate of 0.05, and a total sample size of 608, 
the power achieved is perfect (1.00). Also, for a sample of 129 (Hispanics group size), 
the power is 0.97. 
Procedure 
The three studies on which this data set was based all used the same 
procedure. We will provide here a synopsis of the procedure and refer to the original 
articles by Vrij and colleagues for the full details (Vrij et al., 2017, 2018a, 2019). 
Participants were interviewed about an alleged trip to a city they made during the last 
twelve months. Truth tellers really had made the trip they discussed, whereas liars did 
not. In fact, they had never visited the city they talked about before. Both truth tellers 
and liars were given time to prepare themselves for the interview for which a 
computer with internet access was available. In a pre-interview questionnaire, 
participants rated their thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) 
thorough; (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to 
the three questions were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and the variable is called 
‘preparation thoroughness’. Participants were also asked whether they thought they 
were given enough time to prepare themselves with the following question: ‘Do you 
think the amount of time you were given to prepare was: (1) insufficient to (7) 
sufficient. Finally, they were asked how motivated they were to perform well during 
the interview: (1) not at all motivated to (5) very motivated.  
The interview protocols used in the three studies differed somewhat, but all 
interview protocols invited interviewees to discuss their trip in as much detail as 
possible. Because of the differences between the interview protocols used in the three 
studies, we included ‘study’ as the first (of seven) covariates in the analysis (coded as 
a dummy variable). In the three studies, different manipulations took place to 
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encourage interviewees to provide more details, such as the use of a model statement 
(Vrij et al., 2017) and the use of sketches (Vrij et al., 2018a, 2019). The effects of 
these manipulations have been discussed in the original articles by Vrij and 
colleagues and as such, will not be discussed here. With the obtained data sets, we 
introduced in the current analyses the presence of a manipulation (yes or no) as the 
second covariate (coded as a dummy variable). Finally, in the three studies the 
participants were interviewed either in their own native language by an interviewer 
who shares their native language or in their own native language by an English-
speaking interviewer through an interpreter. The effects of the interpreter have also 
been discussed in the original articles and will not be discussed here. We included in 
the current analyses the presence of an interpreter (yes or no) as the third covariate 
(coded as a dummy variable).  
  In the post-questionnaire, which participants were asked to complete 
truthfully, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they told the truth in 
the interview on a 11 point Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100%.  Rapport between 
the interviewee and interviewer was also measured via the nine items Interaction 
Questionnaire (Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2011).  Participants rated the interviewer 
on 7-point scales ranging from [1] not at all to [7] extremely on nine characteristics 
such as smooth, bored, engrossed, and involved (Cronbach’s alpha = .84).  
Coding 
 The coders, all from the UK, were blind to the Veracity condition in the three 
studies. Some coders coded details, other coders coded complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. A detail is in this study defined as 
a unit of information about the trip the interviewee allegedly had made. To give an 
example, the following answer has seven details: “Im  also drawing a plaza that is in 
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front of the cathedral. There was a large fountain. It had a lot of seats, or benches”. 
Complications and common knowledge details are subcategories of details, but not all 
details are either complications or common knowledge details. In fact, the sentence 
above that contained seven details does not contain a complication or common 
knowledge detail. A complication is an occurrence that makes a situation more 
difficult to report than necessary. For example, the sentence “The hotel beach was full 
of little stones which made it painful to walk on” contains seven details and one 
complication (stones makes walking painful). Common knowledge details refer to 
strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about events. The sentence “We also 
visited a car museum with different Soviet cars” contains five details and the sentence 
also counts as one common knowledge detail. Self-handicapping strategies refer to 
explicit or implicit justifications as to why someone is not able to provide information 
“I’m not very good at remembering names, so I will just tell you like common 
details” (Vrij et al., 2018b). For number of details, a second coder coded a selection of 
the transcripts independently from the first coder. For the remaining variables, two 
coders coded all transcripts independently from each other and discussed their 
disagreements. Reliability between the coders was measured via Intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC). Reliability in all three studies was good for coding details (ICC’s 
ranged from .74 to .92) and complications (ICC’s ranged from .74 to .92) and 
satisfactory for common knowledge details (ICC’s ranged from .64 to .70) and self-
handicapping strategies (ICC’s ranged from .68 to .85), see Vrij et al. (2017, 2018a, 
2019). For all dependent variables, repetitions were never coded. We calculated the 
total number of details, complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies reported in the entire interview. The proportion of 
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complications was calculated as follows: complications/ (complications + common 
knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies). 
Results 
 We present all statistical information for the Veracity main effect in Table 1 
and for the Group main effect in Table 2. For the dependent variables presented in the 
Hypotheses-testing part of this Results section, we report the statistical information 
regardless of whether the Veracity or Group main effects were significant. For the 
remaining dependent variables, all presented before the Hypotheses-testing part, we 
only present the significant results in Tables 1 and 2. 
Preparation thoroughness, preparation time and motivation 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 Three ANOVAs utilizing a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 3 (Group: Russians vs 
Koreans vs Hispanics) between-subjects design were carried out with preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time and motivation as dependent variables. For 
preparation thoroughness, a significant main effect for Veracity emerged, see Table 1. 
Truth tellers rated their preparation as more thorough than liars. The Group main 
effect was also significant, see Table 2. The Hispanic participants judged their 
preparation as more thorough than the Russians and Koreans. The Veracity x Group 
interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 602) = 2.69, p = .069, ηp2 = .01.  
 The Veracity main effect for interview time was also significant, see Table 1. 
Truth tellers believed more than liars that they were given sufficient time to prepare 
themselves for the interview. The Group main effect was also significant, see Table 2. 
Koreans judged their preparation time as significantly poorer than the Hispanics, who, 
in turn, judged it as poorer than the Russians. The Veracity x Group interaction effect 
was also significant, F(1, 602) = 6.29, p = .002, ηp2 = .02. Simple effect tests showed 
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that in all three countries truth tellers more than liars thought that they were given 
sufficient preparation time, but the effect sizes show that this difference was larger 
amongst Koreans (truth tellers M = 5.74, SD = 1.38, 95% CI [5.44, 6.04], liars M = 
4.30, SD = 1.77, 95% CI [4.03, 4.58]), F(1, 238) = 47.98, p < .001, d = .91 (.63, 1.16) 
than amongst Russians (truth tellers M = 6.43, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [6.22, 6.66], liars M 
= 5.82, SD = 1.38, 95% CI [5.60, 6.04]), F(1, 237) = 15.47, p < .001, d = .50 (.24, .75) 
and Hispanics (truth tellers M = 5.76, SD = 1.42, 95% CI [5.43, 6.09], liars M = 5.20, 
SD = 1.48, 95% CI [4.82, 5.59]), F(1, 127) = 4.65, p = .003, d = .39 (.03, .73). 
 For motivation, The Veracity x Group interaction effect was significant, F(1, 
602) = 5.54, p = .004, ηp2 = .02, but the Veracity F(1, 602) = 0.73, p = .392, ηp2 = .001 
and Group F(1, 602) = 1.05, p = .3502, ηp2 = .003 main effects were not. Simple 
effect tests showed that amongst Hispanic participants, truth tellers (M = 4.09, SD = 
0.80, 95% CI [3.91, 4.28]) were more motivated than liars (M = 3.78, SD = 0.84, 95% 
CI [3.56, 4.00]), F(1, 127) = 4.63, p = .033, d = .38 (.02, .73). Amongst the Koreans, 
liars (M = 4.00, SD = 0.64, 95% CI [3.88, 4.11]) were more motivated than truth 
tellers (truth tellers M = 3.81, SD = 0.72, 95% CI [3.68, 3.94]), F(1, 238) = 4.66, p = 
.032, d = .28 (.02, .53), whereas amongst the Russians truth tellers (M = 4.01, SD = 
0.64, 95% CI [3.89, 4.12]) and liars (M = 3.98, SD = 0.61, 95% CI [3.87, 4.10]), F(1, 
237) = 0.10, p = .759, d = .05 (-.21, .30) were equally motivated.  
 We introduced preparation thoroughness, preparation time and motivation (all 
interval variables) as covariates four to six in the Hypotheses-testing analyses.  
Rapport and percentage of truth telling 
 Two ANOVAs utilizing a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 3 (Group: Russians vs 
Koreans vs Hispanics) between-subjects design were carried out with (1) rapport, and 
(2) percentage of truth telling as dependent variables. The analysis with Rapport 
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resulted in a Group main effect, see Table 2. The Russians judged their rapport with 
the interviewer as significantly better than the Koreans and Hispanics. The Veracity 
main effect F(1, 602) = 3.69, p = .055, ηp2 = .006, and Veracity x Group interaction 
effect, F(1, 602) = 1.50, p = .223, ηp2 = .005 were not significant. 
 The analysis with percentage of truth telling revealed a significant Veracity 
main effect, see Table 1. Truth tellers reported to have been more truthful than liars, 
showing that the manipulation was successful. The Group main effect F(1, 602) = 
2.03, p = .132, ηp2 = .007, and Veracity x Group interaction effect, F(1, 602) = 2.07, p 
= .127, ηp2 = .007 were not significant. We included Rapport (an interval variable) as 
the seventh covariate in the Hypotheses-testing analyses.  
Hypothesis-Testing   
  Five ANCOVAs utilizing a 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 3 (Group: Russians vs 
Koreans vs Hispanics) between-subjects design were carried out with the Number of 
details, Complications, Common knowledge details, Self-handicapping strategies and 
Proportion of complications as dependent variables. The seven covariates were study, 
experimental manipulation, interpreter preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation, and rapport. All five Veracity main effects and two of the five Group 
main effects were significant, see Tables 1 and 2. None of the Veracity x Group 
interaction effects were significant, all F’s < 1.18, all p’s > .308.  
 Truth tellers included more total details and complications, and fewer common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies into their accounts than liars. Also 
the proportion of complications was higher for truth tellers than for liars. The effect 
sizes show that total details resulted in the smallest effect (d = .25) and proportion 
complications in the largest effect (d = .94). According to Cohen’s (1988) 
classification2, total details resulted in a small effect, complications, common 
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knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies in medium effects and the 
proportion of complications in a strong effect. Out of complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies, the strongest effect was found for 
complications. They also frequently occurred in truth tellers. Only seven out of 303 
truth tellers (2.3%) did not report a complication. We also calculated the Bayes 
Factors using JASP software.3 The Bayes Factor analyses revealed substantial to very 
strong evidence for all five effects. 
Koreans included more complications in their reports than Russians, whereas 
Hispanics did not differ from either group, see Table 2. In addition, Koreans included 
more common knowledge details in their accounts than Russians and Hispanics, 
whereas the two latter groups did not differ from each other. 
 Despite the absence of any Veracity x Group interaction effect, we also report 
the results for the three groups separately in Table 1 because the aim of the current 
article was to analyse the results for the three groups separately. In all groups, a 
similar pattern of results emerged in that truth tellers reported more complications 
than liars, and liars more common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
than truth tellers (although for Hispanics the common knowledge effect was not 
significant). The proportion of complications was always higher for truth tellers than 
liars.  
For the Russians, total details resulted in a small effect, complications, 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies in medium effects and 
the proportion of complications in a strong effect. However, the main effect for total 
details was not significant (p = .052). The Bayes Factor analyses showed support for 
the null-hypotheses for total details and very strong evidence for the effects for the 
other variables in the Russian sample. 
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For the Koreans, total details resulted in a small effect size, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies in medium effect sizes and 
complications and the proportion of complications in strong effect sizes. In Bayes 
Factors language, we found weak evidence for the effect for total details but very 
strong evidence for the remaining four variables. 
For the Hispanics, we found for total details and common knowledge details 
small effect sizes and evidence for the null hypotheses and for the other variables 
medium effect sizes and very strong evidence for the alternative hypotheses. The 
hypothesis that the proportion of complications is a stronger indicator of deception 
than total details is supported, both in the total sample (d  = .25 vs d = .94) and for the 
three individual groups (total detail d-scores ranged from .22 to .36 and the proportion 
of complications d-scores ranged from .75 to 1.00). 
 We carried out six discriminant analyses to distinguish between truth tellers and 
liars in each of the three groups using either the number of reported details or the 
proportion of complications as predictors. The objective group belonging (truthful 
versus deceptive) was the classifying variable. Total details revealed a significant 
discriminant function only once, in the Korean sample see Table 3. The obtained 
accuracy rate was rather low, 54.20%. The proportion of complications score resulted 
in significant discriminant functions in all three groups with total accuracy rates close 
to 70% in each of the three Groups. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Discussion 
 The proportion of complications was significantly higher in truth tellers than 
liars in all three groups we examined and the effect sizes were strong in each group. 
This means that the proportion of complications shows stability across cultures, in 
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other words, this cue ‘does travel’. If we examine the three cues on which this 
proportion cue is based -complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies- separately, it emerged that complications yielded the 
strongest effect and was significant in all three groups: Complications do thus travel 
as well. Common knowledge details did distinguish truth tellers from liars in the 
Russian and South-Korean samples but not in the Hispanic sample. The data do not 
provide us with the opportunity to explain the absence of an effect amongst Hispanic 
participants but may indicate that common knowledge details are not as diagnostic for 
veracity as complications and self-handicapping strategies are. The self-handicapping 
strategies scores discriminated truth tellers and liars in all three groups but did not 
occur often. This could be somewhat problematic in an applied setting because it 
means that the absence of the cue does not provide valuable information about the 
veracity status of the cue. In contrast, complications do occur frequently. Only seven 
out of 303 truth tellers (2.3%) did not report a complication. 
At this stage we can only speculate why proportion of complications and 
complications showed stability across cultures. These variables are based on truth 
tellers’ and liars’ strategies and perhaps such strategies do not differ much across 
groups. This is an empirical question worth examining.  
The proportion of complications variable yielded accuracy rates close to 70%, 
which is very similar to the accuracy rates obtained in two alternative, more 
established, verbal veracity tools: Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA, Amado et 
al, 2016; Vrij, 2018; Vrij & Fisher, 2016) and the Verifiability Approach (VA, 
Nahari, 2018; Vrij & Fisher, 2016; Vrij & Nahari, 2019). In sum, verbal veracity tools 
seem to result in accuracy rates of around 70%; the next challenge for researchers is 
to improve on these rates.  
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 That the proportion of complications variable yields similar strong effects 
across countries is also good news for investigators. Lie detection is in itself a 
difficult task (e.g. Bond & DePaulo, 2006) and it only further complicates things for 
investigators if some verbal cues are diagnostic in some groups but not in others. The 
latter happened when verbal cues such as person pronouns and spatial information 
were examined (Taylor, Larner, Conchie, & Menacere, 2017; Taylor, Larner, Conchie, 
& van der Zee, 2014). 
 Examining complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping 
strategies and the proportion of complications yielded positive results in all five 
studies published to date (Leal, Vrij, Deeb, & Kamermans, 2019; Vrij, 2017, 2018a, 
b, 2019), and, as the present article showed, revealed positive results across cultures. 
This may warrant recommendation to investigators to start examining these cues. We 
realise that it may be difficult for investigators in interviews to pay attention to all 
three cues in real time and it would be impossible for them to calculate the proportion 
score in real time. However, observing practitioners in training sessions revealed that 
they can count the number of complications reported in interviews in real time. This is 
encouraging news because complications is the strongest cue to veracity of the three 
cues. 
 The variable total details resulted in weaker effects than complications, 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. In fact, total details only 
resulted in a significant effect in the Korean sample, but even in that group it only 
showed weak evidence for the alternative hypothesis. The weak performance of the 
total details findings is not in alignment with the deception literature where it is 
typically found that total details is amongst the most diagnostic verbal cues to 
veracity. Our data set only allows us to speculate why this erratic result for total 
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details emerged. One possibility is that this was caused by the opportunity we gave 
liars to plan their stories. Planning typically improves liars’ performance (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007) and perhaps even more in the deception 
scenario we used in which liars could easily embed their lies in truthful stories. That 
is, most liars probably have made trips in their life before and could thus have 
incorporated truthful details of such trips in their deceptive stories.  
We believe that the weakness of the total details effect, rather than a cultural 
explanation, is the reason why a significant effect only emerged in the Korean sample. 
We cannot think of a theoretical explanation why the finding that truth tellers 
typically report more details than liars would depend on the culture, because we 
believe the reason why this is the case- liars are unable and unwilling to report as 
many details as liars- to be universal.  
We believe that in the proportion of complications research domain three 
research activities in particular are welcome, all three related to testing the robustness 
of the effect. First, to date it has only been investigated in Vrij’s lab, but replications 
of the findings across research labs will make the results more robust. Second, to date 
it only has been examined in one deception scenario, the travel scenario (Leal, Vrij, 
Deeb, & Kamermans, 2019; Vrij et al., 2017, 2018a, b, 2019). Since the context is 
important for lie detection, research examining other scenarios would be welcome. 
Such scenarios need to be carefully chosen. It is important that complications, 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies occur spontaneously, 
which means that the truths and lies participants report should be self-generated (Vrij 
et al., 2017). In most deception research truth tellers (and sometimes liars) are 
instructed to carry out relatively short specific tasks or to watch a video (Vrij, 2008). 
In such scenarios, the number of complications is then preliminary determined by the 
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stimulus material. In studies where truth tellers and liars are allowed to choose their 
own activities they want to carry out -common procedure in the Verifiability 
Approach research (Nahari, 2018; Vrij & Nahari, 2019), these activities are typically 
short of duration (around thirty minutes) which automatically limits the number of 
complications that could occur. Third, as noted by Nahari et al. (2019), the proportion 
of complications results would become stronger if truth tellers would report more 
complications and fewer common knowledge details. Researchers could design 
methods to encourage truth tellers to do this.  
In conclusion, the results showed that complications, common knowledge 
details, self-handicapping strategies and proportion of complications are diagnostic 
cues to deceit in different cultures. We believe that these cues, particularly observing 
complications, may be ready for use by practitioners in real life. We recommend 
future research to focus on replication of the findings in different labs and different 
deception scenarios and on methods to encourage truth tellers to report more 
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Table 1  
Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity 
 Truth  Lie 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d BF10 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI  
Preparation thoroughness 04.81 (01.18) 04.73, 04.99  04.32 (01.12) 04.21, 04.49 27.64 < .001 0.43 0.26, 0.58  
Preparation time 06.01 (01.30) 05.81, 06.14  05.07 (01.71) 04.94, 05.28 51.24 < .001 0.62 0.45, 0.77  
Percentage truthful 94.51 (10.43) 92.27, 96.78  21.13 (25.74) 17.73, 22.49 1984.29 < .001 3.73 3.41, 3.93  
Total sample (N = 608)           
Number of details 178.11 (210.79) 158.41, 189.99  136.36 (111.51) 119.15, 152.31 10.43 .001 0.25 0.08, 0.40 8.388 
Number of complications 11.15 (10.90) 10.05, 12.01  05.57 (04.64) 04.64, 06.70 52.54 < .001 0.67 0.49, 0.82 4.242e+12 
Number of common knowledge details 04.28 (03.13) 03.96, 04.71  05.90 (03.53) 05.33,06.13 23.70 < .001 0.49 0.32, 0.64 2.287e+6 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.31 (00.59) 00.22, 00.41  00.79 (01.02) 00.66, 00.86 36.44 <. 001 0.58 0.40, 0.73 1.183e+9 
Proportion of complications 00.64 (00.26) 00.61, 00.67  00.41 (00.23) 00.39, 00.45 97.68 < .001 0.94 0.76, 1.09 8.056e+23 
Russians (N = 239)           
Number of details 177.03 (261.81) 145.66, 208.73  132.75 (102.64) 101.73, 163.45 03.83 .052 0.22 -0.03, 0.48 0.584 
Number of complications 10.53 (13.07) 08.72, 12.28  04.80 (04.83) 03.09, 06.58 19.35 < .001 0.59 0.32, 0.84 1692.516 
Number of common knowledge details 03.86 (02.93) 03.30, 04.42  05.57 (03.79) 05.02, 06.11 17.96 < .001 0.50 0.34, 0.66 146.779 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.33 (00.68) 00.19, 00.48  00.75 (00.87) 00.61, 00.90 15.72 < .001 0.54 0.27, 0.79 371.386 
Proportion of complications 00.63 (00.27) 00.58, 00.68  00.38 (00.25) 00.34, 00.44 48.85 < .001 0.96 0.68, 1.21 4.816e+9 
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Koreans (N = 240)           
Number of details 196.90 (142.49) 185.17, 226.86  150.14 (119.02) 123.13, 161.47 17.60 < .001 0.36 0.10, 0.61 1.681 
Number of complications 12.46 (09.77) 11.22, 14.15  06.32 (04.18) 04.77, 07.47 37.80 < .001 0.84 0.56, 1.09 1.706e+7 
Number of common knowledge details 04.68 (03.23) 04.23, 05.52  06.52 (03.37) 05.75, 06.94 09.78 .002 0.56 0.29, 0.81 712.767 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.33 (00.56) 00.18, 00.55  00.86 (01.18) 00.66, 01.00 11.87 < .001 0.56 0.29, 0.81 674.869 
Proportion of complications 00.65 (00.24) 00.61, 00.69  00.43 (00.20) 00.39, 00.47 45.33 < .001 1.00 0.72, 1.26 3.240e+9 
Hispanics (N = 129)           
Number of details 151.99 (132.63) 120.68, 163.38  111.63 (109.31) 100.05, 150.86 00.93 .338 0.33 -.03, 0.67 0.863 
Number of complications 10.17 (08.44) 08.18, 11.52  05.50 (05.02) 03.97, 07.93 08.41 .004 0.65 0.28, 1.00 62.360 
Number of common knowledge details 04.33 (03.24) 03.55, 05.06  05.15 (03.05) 04.29, 06.09 02.12 .148 0.26 -.10, 0.61 0.488 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.23 (00.48) 00.08, 00.39  00.69 (00.89) 00.49, 00.86 12.66 .001 0.77 0.39, 1.12 98.105 
Proportion of complications 00.64 (00.27) 00.58, 00.70  00.44 (00.26) 00.37, 00.52 13.82 <. 001 0.75 0.38, 1.10 585.321 
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Table 2  
Statistical Results as a Function of Nationality 
 Russians  Koreans  Hispanic     
 M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI  F p  
Preparation thoroughness 04.52a (1.08) [03.91, 04.08]  04.42a (01.09) [03.82, 03.99]  04.91b (01.39) [03.81, 4.06]  05.66 .00   
Preparation time 06.12c (1.25) [04.38, 04.66]  04.97a (01.75) [04.30, 04.58]  05.53b (01.47) [04.65, 5.05]  36.18 < .00   
Rapport 05.85b (0.71) [05.75, 05.95]  05.39a (00.83) [05.30, 05.50]  05.28a (00.86) [05.12, 05.40]  30.43 < .00   
Number of details 154.43 (198.13) [136.09, 172.21]  171.77 (158.70) [154.97, 189.90]  135.09 (124.57) [114.31, 162.31]  02.75 .06   
Complications 07.61a (10.17) [06.36, 08.60]  09.16b (07.92) [08.38, 10.55]  08.22ab (07.55) [06.61, 09.59]  03.09 .04   
Common knowledge details 04.73a (03.49) [04.27, 05.14]  05.67b (03.43) [05.17, 06.01]  04.67a (03.18) [04.23, 05.38]  04.63 .01   
Self-handicapping strategies 00.55 (00.81) [00.42, 00.64]  00.62 (00.98) [00.49, 00.70]  00.42 (00.71) [00.34, 00.64]  00.69 .50   
Proportions of complications 00.51 (00.29) [00.47, 00.54]  00.53 (00.25) [00.51, 00.58]  00.56 (00.28) [00.50, 00.59]  01.30 .27   
Note. Only mean scores with a different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .05).  
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Table 3.  
 
Accuracy Rates for the Number of Total Details and Complications and the Proportion of Complications as a Function of Veracity. 







    
Russians 
Number of details    2.98 .987 .084 .112 
Proportion of complications 65.0 72.1 68.6 50.20 .809 < .001 .437 
 
Koreans 
       
Number of details 36.9 69.0 54.2 5.20 .978 .023 .147 
Proportion of complications 
 
73.0 67.4 70.0 49.39 .812 < .001 .433 
Hispanics  
Number of details    3.30 .974 .069 .160 
Proportion of complications 68.0 66.7 67.4 17.24 .873 < .001 .357 
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1 Vrij et al. (2018c) was a subset of Vrij et al. (2018a).  
2 According to Cohen (1988), effect sizes of d = 20 are small, effect sizes of d =.50 are medium and effect sizes of d = .80 are large. 
3 Bayes factors allow for further inferences to be drawn regarding the evidence in an experiment (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). Bayes factor analysis is 
a method to test the probability of the observed data under the null hypothesis compared to the alternative hypothesis (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 
2012). A BF10 smaller than 1 indicates evidence for the absence of an effect (support of the null hypothesis). According to the cut-off thresholds 
provided by Jeffreys (1961), BF values between 1 and 3 suggest weak evidence for the alternative hypothesis, values between 3 and 10 suggest 
substantial evidence, values between 10 and 20 constitute strong evidence, and values above 20 constitute very strong evidence. We used the 
default Cauchy’s prior of .707 for the Bayesian t-tests (Lakens, 2016). 
                                                 
